Achieving interactive consistency among processors in the presence of faults is an important problem in fault tolerant computing, rst cleanly formulated by Lamport, Pease and Shostak and solved in selected cases with their Oral Messages (OM) Algorithm. Several machine-supported veri cations of this algorithm have been presented, including a particularly elegant formulation and proof by John Rushby using EHDM and PVS. Rushby proposes interactive consistency as a benchmark problem for speci cation and veri cation systems. We present a formalization of the OM algorithm in the ACL2 logic and compare our formalization and proof to his. We draw some conclusions concerning the range of desirable features for veri cation systems. In particular, while higher-order functions, strong typing, lambda abstraction and full quanti cation have some value they come with a cost; moreover, many uses of such feature can be easily translated into simpler logical constructs which facilitate more automated proof discovery. We o er a cautionary note about comparing systems with respect to a small set of problems in a limited domain.
Introduction
Achieving interactive consistency among processors in the presence of faults is an important problem in fault tolerant computing, rst cleanly formulated by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease 14, 9] and solved in selected cases with their Oral Messages (OM) Algorithm. Several mechanically checked verications of this algorithm have been presented, including one by Bevier and Young 2] using Nqthm 4] and a particularly elegant formulation by Rushby using EHDM 15, 19] and PVS 12, 13] 1 . Rushby draws some comparisons between his formulation and the earlier Bevier/Young version and between the automated tools used in the proofs. In particular, he cites the strong typing and higher-order functions available in PVS as helpful in leading to his improved formulation. He proposes interactive consistency as a potential benchmark for speci cation and veri cation systems.
Rushby's formalization of the Oral Messages algorithm is indeed signicantly more elegant than the earlier Bevier/Young version and makes use of several features of EHDM and PVS not available in Nqthm, including higher order functions, lambda expressions, and full quanti cation. His proof is also quite di erent, and closer to the journal proof. We cannot dispute Rushby's claim that he found various features helpful in his thinking about the problem. But one might infer also from his success in formally analyzing the Oral Messages algorithm and other fault tolerant algorithms 12] that the features of EHDM and PVS highlighted by these e orts are either necessary or highly desirable in a modern speci cation and proof system. It is that implied suggestion that we question.
We have duplicated Rushby's formalization and proof of the Oral Messages algorithm using ACL2 7, 11] , the successor to Nqthm. The formalization of the algorithm in ACL2, the statement of its correctness properties and their proof are very similar to Rushby's. We make the argument that the advantages of Rushby's version over the earlier Bevier/Young proof are due much more to cleverness in the formalization and proof than to any strengths of the logic or automated proof system. The point is not to disparage the insight and ne work of John Rushby and his colleagues in tackling dicult problems in fault tolerance, but to o er a cautionary note on comparing proof systems with respect to any small problem or set of problems within a particular domain.
In the following sections, we describe the problem solved by the Oral Messages algorithm, sketch Rushby's formalization of the algorithm, present our formalization in the ACL2 logic and compare our formalization and proof to Rushby's. We draw some conclusions concerning the range of desirable features for veri cation systems. A small warning is in order: it is not among the goals of this paper to teach the details of the Oral Messages algorithm, of ACL2, or of any other logic. That material is much better covered elsewhere. However, we feel that one can follow our discussion without having considerable knowledge in those areas.
Interactive Consistency and OM
The problem addressed by the Oral Messages algorithm is the following: given a number of communicating processors, how can they arrive at a consistent common view of the system if there are faulty processors among them which potentially send con icting information to di erent parts of the system. Lamport, Shostak, and Pease 9] describe the problem in terms of the colorful metaphor of Byzantine Generals attempting to arrive at a common battle plan through an exchange of messages. One or more may be traitorous and attempt to thwart the loyal generals by preventing them from reaching agreement. 2 Lamport, et al. phrase the problem in terms of a single commanding general communicating with a number of lieutenant generals. The goal is an algorithm which guarantees the following.
A commanding general must send an order to his n?1 lieutenant generals such that IC1. All loyal lieutenants obey the same order.
IC2
. If the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends. Conditions IC1 and IC2 are called the interactive consistency conditions.
The generals' communication is assumed to have the following characteristics.
1. Every message that is sent is correctly delivered.
2. The receiver of a message knows who sent it.
3. The absence of a message can be detected.
Notice that we are assuming synchronous systems in all of our discussions.
The Oral Messages algorithm OM (m) describes m rounds of communication among the generals and is inductively de ned for all nonnegative integers m. The goal is to convey an order by the commanding general to each of n ? 1 lieutenants. The description of the algorithm from 9] is as follows: This version of the algorithm is \asymmetric" in the sense that the commanding general is in a distinguished position with respect to the lieutenants. There is also a symmetric version of the algorithm in which all processors are treated similarly. In the symmetric version, there is no distinguished commander. Rather, each processor has a value which to broadcast to each of the other n ? 1 generals. Each processor runs the same algorithm and computes a vector of values, one for each process. Rushby calls the symmetric version OMIC (Oral Messages, Interactive Consistency) and the asymmetric version OMBG (Oral Messages, Byzantine Generals).
To see how the algorithm works, consider the simplest interesting scenario: four processors, a commanding general and three lieutenants, where one of the four is traitorous. In this case, the algorithm requires one round of exchanges. The commander rst sends an order to the three lieutenants. Then, each lieutenant relays the value received to each of the other lieutenants. There are two possibilities: the traitor is one of the three lieutenants, or is the commander. Suppose the traitorous party is one of the three lieutenants, say P1. This means that the loyal commander has broadcast the same order to each of the three. The traitor may relay arbitrary values (or no value at all) to the other lieutenants. However, each of the two loyal lieutenants receives one reliable value from the commander and another relayed by the other loyal lieutenant. Taking the majority of the three values received, the loyal lieutenants arrive at a consistent shared view of the general's order, and one which corresponds to the order actually sent. Thus, IC1 and IC2 are satis ed. This scenario is illustrated in the left hand side of the diagram above. Now, suppose the commanding general is the traitorous party, and all lieutenants are loyal. The lieutenants may receive arbitrary values from the commander, which they faithfully relay to their comrades. Each of the three lieutenants receives the same three values, one from the commander and one from each of the other two lieutenants. If there is a majority, they each compute the same value; if none, each records the default value of retreat. Again, IC1 and IC2 are satis ed. The right hand side of the diagram above illustrates this scenario.
These two scenarios illustrate how the loyal lieutenants can arrive at a consistent view of the general's value via this single exchange of messages provided that there is no more than one traitor among the four processors. In general, with n processors of which m are faulty, the OM algorithm achieves interactive consistency with m exchanges assuming n 3m + 1. Proving this fact, by induction on m, is the goal of each of the formalizations we will consider.
Lamport, et al. also proved that the OM algorithm is optimal among its class of algorithms. That is, no algorithm relying solely on oral message passing for interprocess communication can achieve interactive consistency among a collection of processors if at least a third of the total are faulty. The proofs of lemmas IC1 and IC2 are a fairly di cult exercise in mechanical theorem proving. In one sense, there was no proof discovery; Lamport, Shostak, and Pease provide \journal level" proofs that their version of the algorithm satis es IC1 and IC2. However, the gap between what is currently acceptable to even the best of mechanical theorem provers and to the mathematically sophisticated reader of a technical journal is still substantial.
The Bevier/Young version used a rather awkward mutually recursive formalization on arrays and a complex invariant for the recursive cases. Moreover, their proof followed the purely constructive style common in the quanti erfree logic of Nqthm. 3 This led Rushby to observe that he \continued to nd the journal description and proof more compelling than their formal version" 15] and to develop an alternative formulation and proof of the algorithm using EHDM.
Of course, in a very real sense a machine checked formalization does not need to be as compelling as a journal version, if the prover is sound. It is su cient for the problem formulation to be clear and accurate, assuming we trust the machine-checked proof. Rushby himself argues strongly 16] that machine-checked proofs are required for fault-tolerant algorithms, such as OM, precisely because of their extreme subtlety and the tendency to get informal proofs wrong. However, the cleaner the formulation of the algorithm, the higher the likelihood that it will be scrutinized carefully and understood well by potential users and implementors. Therefore, even a machine certi ed proof will be most useful if it conveys insight.
Rushby reformulated the algorithm using rst the EHDM system 19] and later PVS 12] . His formulation 15] is decidedly simpler and more elegant than the version by Bevier and Young. Rushby \found that one of the keys to simplifying the algorithm was to focus on the symmetric formulation (which is actually the form required), rather than the asymmetric Byzantine Generals form" 12] used by Bevier and Young. For completeness Rushby included formalizations of both the symmetric (OMIC) and asymmetric (OMBG) versions of the algorithm. He reports that his formalization of OMBG is due to his colleague Shankar, and that its formal veri cation \is very similar to that of OMIC, and was derived from that of OMIC in less than a day" 15]. However, he also observes that \the formulation and veri cation of the BG version would have been signi cantly more di cult had we not already performed the IC version; that is speci cation and veri cation of IC followed by BG is probably much simpler than tackling BG alone," which is the route followed by Bevier and Young. In the current paper, we will concentrate on the formalization of the OMIC version.
Rushby's version of the symmetric (OMIC) algorithm is given in Figure  1 . Notice that it describes a higher order function which returns a function from processors to vectors of values. A vector, in turn, is a mapping from processors to values. Conceptually, OMIC (r; v; caucus)(p)(q) gives p's opinion of q's value after r rounds of the algorithm, where v is the vector of initial values of all processes and caucus is the set of processors under consideration. The text in Figure 1 is neither raw EHDM nor PVS syntax. However, it (or something very like it) can be generated automatically from the PVS source using L a T E X.
Rushby's formulation of the interactive consistency conditions IC1 and IC2 for OMIC are given in Figure 2 . These are not the nal theorems, but rather the interesting inductive versions of the conditions. They are introduced rst as universally quanti ed notions; lemmas are then introduced asserting that these conditions actually hold for arbitrary parameters. The nal theorems on the full set of processes follow immediately from the inductive versions. It is often necessary, as in this case, to prove a stronger inductive theorem than the theorem actually desired. We do not include the OMBG version of the algorithm, which was the version used in the original Bevier/Young formalization.
In comparing his formulation to the Bevier/Young version, Rushby makes the following points:
A signi cant improvement was gained by using the symmetric formulation of the problem, rather than the asymmetric version used by Bevier and Young.
The richer speci cation capabilities available in EHDM and PVS avoided the need for the mutual recursion in the Nqthm script.
The design decisions of EHDM (and presumably of PVS), such as strong typing, lambda abstraction and higher order logic, led to a much more perspicuous formalization.
According to Rushby, the upshot was that: \The complexity discovered by Bevier and Young was an artifact of their formalization and of the theorem prover at their disposal" 15]. In the following, we would like to examine the question of how much of the improvement is really due to the di erent formalization and how much to the choice of logic and theorem prover. To do so, we rst brie y describe ACL2, the successor to Nqthm, and then provide a translation of Rushby's OMIC formalization into ACL2.
Brief Description of ACL2
ACL2 is an extended, reimplemented version of Nqthm 4] that reasons about an applicative subset of Common Lisp. It has been designed and implemented by J Moore and Matt Kaufmann at CLI, with assistance and inspiration from Bob Boyer. The system is described more fully elsewhere in this issue 11].
By formalizing a logic around applicative Common Lisp the designers take advantage of the exceptionally good optimizing compilers for Common Lisp to get, in many cases, execution speeds comparable to C. Two guiding tenets of the ACL2 project have been to conform to all compliant Common Lisp implementations and to add nothing to the logic that violates the understanding that the user's input can be submitted directly to a Common Lisp compiler and then executed in an environment where suitable ACL2-speci c macros and functions are de ned.
The ACL2 Logic
The ACL2 logic is a rst order logic of recursive functions providing mathematical induction on the ordinals up to 0 and two extension principles: one for recursive de nition and one for constrained introduction of new function symbols. Each preserves the consistency of the extended logic. Examples of each are given in Section 4.3 below.
The syntax of ACL2 is that of Common Lisp. In addition, ACL2 supports the macro facility of Common Lisp. Macros provide a powerful abbreviation facility and can be used to make speci cations much more succinct and easier to grasp. Because Common Lisp macros use functions to compute their results, macros provide an extremely powerful extension facility to the syntax of the language.
The following primitive data types are axiomatized: rational and complex numbers, character objects, strings, symbols, and lists. Common Lisp 
Theorem Prover
The ACL2 theorem prover is a reimplementation of the Nqthm theorem prover 4] for the ACL2 logic. Every proof technique of Nqthm has been implemented in ACL2. Many have been extended signi cantly.
The prover has sophisticated heuristics controlling the application of the following proof techniques: preprocessing including tautology checking using ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) if directed by the user; simplication by primitive type checking and rewriting; destructor elimination; cross-fertilization using equivalence reasoning; generalization; elimination of irrelevant hypotheses; and mathematical induction.
ACL2's data base is a hierarchical collection of de nitions and theorems grouped into \books." A book can be included by reference into other books and multiple books can be read to construct the active data base. Books allow multiple users to share one another's work. Books can also de ne \theories" and theory manipulation functions. When two books are loaded together, checks are done to insure their logical compatibility.
ACL2 has numerous other features and facilities. Users of Nqthm will nd the style of interaction with ACL2 very familiar, though the additional features make it a more powerful and versatile tool.
Some ACL2 Examples
The following is an example of a typical ACL2 function de nition, in this case a recursive function which takes a list l of processors and returns a list of those which are \faulty." It behaves as follows: If we have reached the end of the list, return the empty list (nil). Otherwise, if the rst element of the list satis es the previously de ned predicate ok, recur on the remainder of the list. If not, add that element onto the result of recurring on the remainder.
(defun faulty-members (l) (if (endp l) nil (if (ok (car l)) (faulty-members (cdr l)) (cons (car l) (faulty-members (cdr l))))))
Assuming that ok is a previously introduced executable function, this form both de nes an executable Common Lisp function and a logical de nition within the ACL2 logic.
A trivial property of this de nition is expressed in the following ACL2 theorem:
(defthm faulty-member-not-ok (implies (member-equal p (faulty-members caucus)) (not (ok p))))
It asserts that any element of the faulty-members of a list caucus does not satisfy the predicate ok. ACL2 proves this by induction, generating an appropriate induction schema from the de nition of the function faulty-members. This theorem later may be invoked automatically as a conditional rewrite rule to reduce an occurrence of (ok x) to nil, assuming that the hypothesis can be relieved in context.
ACL2 also supports the introduction of axiomatically constrained function symbols which have no executable counterpart. For example, the following form introduces a new function symbol send of four arguments. The function send is constrained to satisfy an axiom asserting that, if its third and fourth arguments are the names of ok processors, the value returned is its second argument. We are assured that adding this axiom maintains consistency because we are required to exhibit a \witness" function|the supplied local de nition of send|which is used in proving the axiom. Only the name of the introduced function, its arity, and the axiom send-reduction1 are visible outside the encapsulate form. if l = x l 0^: ok (x): Such a notation probably has bene t when presenting the work to a non-Lispliterate audience, and it can be generated automatically from Lisp code. 5 But it is potentially ambiguous, signi cantly harder to parse mechanically than the Lisp syntax, and may be a detriment when attempting to understand the algorithm and devise a correct implementation for anyone who has expended the minimal e ort to learn Lisp syntax. We'll return to the question of syntax in Section 6.
Formalizing OM in ACL2
Our goal in revisiting the Oral Messages algorithm with ACL2 was not to contribute a new formalization, but to evaluate how ACL2 performed given the elegant formalization discovered by Rushby. In this section we describe our formalization of the OMIC version of the algorithm. We have also carried out a formalization and proof of the OMBG version of the algorithm. However, there were no additional interesting lessons gained from that exercise, so we will concentrate on the OMIC version.
Studying Notice, however, that the correctness conditions always refer to speci c values of this higher order function. That is, instead of OMIC (r; v; caucus); the interactive consistency conditions always make reference to a vector of values OMIC (r; v; caucus)(p) or to a speci c value OMIC (r; v; caucus)(p)(q): Thus, rather than attempting to simulate Rushby's higher order function directly, we can \uncurry" his higher order expressions and de ne a pair of mutually recursive functions that compute these two expressions directly.
(mutual-recursion (defun omic (r v caucus p q) (if (and (member-equal p caucus) (member-equal q caucus)) (if (zp r) (send 0 (binding q v) q p) (if (equal p q) (send r (binding q v)) (maj (remove q caucus) (omic1 (1-r) (distr r (binding q v) q) (remove q caucus) p (remove q caucus))))) (undef))) (defun omic1 (r v caucus p qlist) (if (endp qlist) nil (let ((q (car qlist))) (cons (cons q (omic r v caucus p q)) (omic1 r v caucus p (cdr qlist)))))))
Figure 4: The ACL2 Version of OMIC
The result is a rst order formalization of the OMIC algorithm that compares favorably in complexity to Rushby's version. The formalization in ACL2 notation is given in Figure 4 . In the interest of factoring out the question of syntax, an equivalent version in a more conventional syntax is given in Figure 5 .
Here Even to the unpracticed eye, the ACL2 version no more complex than the PVS version and, for many readers, it may even be substantially simpler since it does not involve the higher-order constructs and lambda expressions in Rushby's version. 6 Certainly, for a practiced Lisp programmer familiar 6 In truth, our rst version was much more complicated because it simulated the computation of the higher order function. A reviewer suggested computing the required values directly, rather than computing the two dimensional array of values suggested by the higher order construction. The change was easy and it greatly simpli es the speci cation.
(defthm OMIC-PROP1
(implies (zp r) (equal (omic r v caucus p q) (if (and (member-equal q caucus) (member-equal p caucus)) (send 0 (binding q v) q p) (undef))))) (defthm OMIC-PROP2
(implies (not (zp r)) (equal (omic r v caucus p q) (if (and (member-equal p caucus) (member-equal q caucus)) (if (equal p q) (send r (binding q v)) (maj (remove q caucus) (omic1 (-r 1) (distr r (binding q v) q) (remove q caucus) p (remove q caucus)))) (undef))))) Figure 6 : Properties of OMIC with standard recursive list programming idioms, the translation is straightforward. Our original coding of Rushby's algorithm took about two hours. It has gone through various simplifying revisions, each of which also took only a few hours. We believe any competent Lisp programmer could have carried out the translation, given the requisite insight regarding \uncurrying" the higher order function.
What con dence do we have that this formulation is actually equivalent to Rushby's version? Using the ACL2 prover, we have easily proved the lemmas in Figure 6 . In more traditional mathematical notation, these can be rendered as follows: Modulo the trick of \uncurrying" the higher order function calls, these theorems show that our version of the algorithm returns precisely the same value as Rushby's. In fact, they correspond almost exactly to Rushby's lemmas OM0 prop and OM prop, which he (and we) used in proofs of the interactive consistency conditions rather than the actual de nition of OMIC. The proof was complicated only slightly by the need for our extra function OMIC1.
Our formalization of the two conditions IC1 and IC2 are given in Figure  7 . Notice that, following Rushby, we introduce the desired property as a universally quanti ed property, and then prove by induction a lemma stating that the property holds invariantly under appropriate conditions. Except for the notational di erence and the fact that some type information is transferred from the function de nitions to explicit hypotheses, the statements of Rushby's version and ours are essentially identical. As with Rushby's version, the nal theorems on the full set of processes follows immediately from the inductive versions. Following Rushby's proof structure 15], we were able to formulate and prove our versions of the interactive consistency conditions in a little over a day. 7 Except for replacing some quanti ed notions in Rushby's version by recursive functions, our proof structure is very similar to his. The complete ACL2 script of the proof is available from the author.
Comparisons
Di erent automated proof systems have their own strengths and weaknesses. ACL2 is an expressive logic closely tied to a real programming language. The prover is powerful and versatile, particularly with respect to problems couched in its \native" domain of recursively de ned functions. Because of the higher-order functions and embedded lambda expressions Rushby's formulation of the Oral Messages algorithm problem was not an obvious candidate for treatment in ACL2. Nevertheless, we feel that ACL2 performed admirably, without any real complication in the statement of the algorithm or the proofs.
(defun-sk C1-PROP (r)
Syntactic Issues
The Lisp syntax is a major stumbling block for many new users of ACL2. But it has the advantages of being completely unambiguous without any ancillary precedence rules, and is trivially machine parsed, making it much easier to perform meta-theoretic reasoning about terms in the logic, for example. \Traditional" notation requires considerably more e ort to parse. Some recent research 6] suggests that so-called \standard mathematical notations" in fact may be quite di cult to understand except to the expert, exactly because of such complex ancillary rules. For example, we noted in 21] that the published proof of the Interactive Convergence Clock Synchronization algorithm in EHDM 18] is unnecessarily confusing in places because the expected precedence was not observed in generating \traditional" notation from the EHDM internal form.
In our translation of the OMBG version of the algorithm into ACL2 we encountered another instance of the ambiguity of \traditional" notation. In our initial translation we misinterpreted the following lambda expression: q : OMBG (q; r ? 1; send (r; t; G; q); caucus-fGg)(p):
This should be interpreted as q : OMBG (q; r ? 1; send (r; t; G; q); caucus-fGg)(p)]; rather than as q : OMBG (q; r ? 1; send (r; t; G; q); caucus-fGg)](p):
In our initial attempt to translate the PVS version into ACL2, we made the wrong reading and this error took an hour or so to discover and correct. As an experiment, we added parentheses to the PVS script and tried to parse both renderings. Each parsed without complaint. Only the failure of Rushby's proof to replay for the mistaken interpretation distinguished the two versions. The PVS type correctness conditions might somehow catch the error, but we are not sure.
In fairness, our precedence error might have been immediately obvious to a seasoned PVS user or to an expert in lambda calculus. However, any but the most cautious reader might be led astray by an expression such as, A&B = B&A and A&B <=> B&A, where A and B are Boolean variables. Because of the precedence rules of PVS the rst would be parsed as: (A&(B = B)&A), but the second as (A&B) <=> (B&A). 8 The possibility of such anomalies points up one strong advantage of the unambiguous Lisp syntax.
The Lisp syntax of ACL2 derives from the decision to make a prover for a real programming language. Thus, in addition to analysis of abstract algorithms, ACL2 can verify e ciently executable implementations. An input capability currently under development should produce the bene t of allowing a more traditional syntax while preserving the core strengths of the ACL2 logic and prover and the tie to executable Common Lisp.
We agree with Rushby that \The value of syntactic conveniences ...] should not be underestimated; we nd that they reduce learning time, and ease comprehension and communication " 12] . But they also should not be overestimated. Our experience is that such syntactic issues are a relatively minor concern for serious users of automated proof tools, when compared to the intellectual e ort of analyzing complex algorithms. We acknowledge, however, that syntax does present an issue when publishing formal veri cations and making them available to a wider audience. For that reason, many of our published papers (e.g. 23]) use a more traditional mathematical syntax similar to that displayed earlier.
Features of the Logic
Is our formalization of the OMIC algorithm as perspicuous as Rushby's, independent of the surface syntax of the logic? The answer depends on whom you ask. For an audience used to recursive programming idioms and uncomfortable with higher order logics, our version is probably much more perspicuous. The ability in EHDM and PVS to use strong typing, general lambda expressions, higher order functions, and unrestricted quanti cation undoubtedly does provide an expressive speci cation capability. However, the real utility of each of these features in the di cult process of analyzing complex algorithms is largely a matter of taste, one might even say a matter of \religion."
For example, the question of how strongly typed a programming and speci cation language should be is a matter of continuing debate. For example, consider the following opinion from Leslie Lamport:
T]ypes are not just unnecessary, they are harmful in formalizing mathematics...Most computer scientists have an unreasonable attachment to types...We can assure the reader that mathematicians have gotten along quite well for two thousand years without types, and they still can today 8].
Lisp derives much of its expressive utility from its weak typing; on the other hand, considerable execution e ciency can be gained from type declarations. ACL2 preserves both bene ts by the judicious integration of an untyped logic with guards to insure compliance with e ciently executable raw Lisp implementations 11]. In theorems, \type" hypotheses can be included where needed. As in PVS this permits using arbitrary predicates as \types" but also requires arbitrarily hard theorem proving to assure type compliance.
Regarding higher order features and lambda expressions: they often are elegant, but seldom necessary. It is undoubtedly possible to contrive PVS speci cation which make essential use of the higher order aspects of the language and could not be translated into a rst order context; however, these seem to be rare. We have found in translating several speci cations (e.g. the Interactive Convergence Clock Synchronization Algorithm 21] and the current e ort) from a higher order framework to a rst order framework that we have not had any di culty. This suggests that the \higher orderness" of these speci cation is primarily a notational convenience.
Most lambda terms can be translated directly into recursive functions, though often at the cost of additional parameters. Of course, lambda expressions returning lambda terms are inherently higher order. Use of such expressions and of higher order functions sometimes yields a terse and elegant representation, though not necessarily a particularly perspicuous one. It is not really clear how many potential users of a speci cation language are familiar and comfortable with higher order functions.
Finally, the limited style of quanti cation available in ACL2 often requires de ning a separate quanti ed notion rather than using a quanti er in place. In many instances, we have found that a call to an appropriate recursive function serves our purposes better than a quanti er. For proving properties of such recursive functions, the ACL2 prover is outstanding. However, the availability of both quanti cation and recursion in ACL2 is often a boon. Full quanti cation undoubtedly would lead to cleaner speci cations in some cases.
Rushby's main claim in comparing his proof to the Bevier/Young version is that the richness and expressiveness of the speci cation language at his disposal led him to discover cleaner and more perspicuous versions of the algorithms. Since it reports personal experience, this claim is irrefutable. However, the implied suggestion that most other potential users will be able to make truly e ective use of higher order functions, lambda abstraction, etc. is dubious, as is the suggestion that the resulting speci cations are likely to be more readible or more accessible.
Proof Issues
Simply by virtue of its richness, higher order logic can present challenges to automated proof discovery tools that are not encountered for rst order logic. For example, uni cation is straightforward for rst order logic, di cult for second order (producing perhaps an in nite number of uni ers), and undecidable for third order. Thus, the elegance gained in speci cation must be weighed against the potential additional proof burden. Perhaps this burden is necessary for problems which are inherently higher order. However, as we suggested above, such problems seem to be rare. Use of a more restrictive logic means that more e ort sometimes must be invested in the speci cation, but is often repaid with increased automation in the proof.
Di erences in the PVS and ACL2 provers arise from di erences in the logics supported and in the goals of the designers. The PVS prover has the feel of an interactive proof-checker but with some powerful proof techniques and decision procedures built in. A PVS proof is an explicitly interactive activity which can be carried on at a fairly low level, making PVS somewhat more accessible to new users. Proofs are stored as an explicit tree of prover commands. ACL2 is more in the automated proof school, with guidance to the prover given in the form of a sequence of \events"{de nitions and theorems which successively \educate" the prover. This knowledge is used in subsequent proofs under control of various heuristics. The proof of any theorem is implicit in the sequence of events leading up to it. However, an available interactive interface to ACL2 allows low-level proof checking as well.
The main hazard of low-level proofs in either system is that such proofs are fragile. Any upgrade to the speci cation or to the prover may cause an earlier proof script to fail to replay because some of the explicit low-level steps recorded in the script no longer apply or have been obviated. We encountered this in attempting to replay Rushby's PVS proofs of OMIC and OMBG. An upgrade to the prover after these proofs had been recorded had apparently caused the induction mechanism to automatically prove one of the cases which had previously required explicit action on the user's part. Consequently, the proofs would not replay without our understanding the rather cryptic proof scripting notation and manually editing the proof tree. Low-level ACL2 proofs are susceptible to the same problem; for that reason most accomplished ACL2 users avoid them. We nd that the expense of developing appropriate de nitions and general, powerful rewrite rules usually pays o in proof modi cation and replay. We see no reason why this lesson could not be applied in PVS as well. However, disciplined avoidance of lowlevel proof \hacking" would eliminate some of the apparent accessibility of the PVS proof-checker interface.
Conclusions
In serious applications of automated reasoning the di culty of accommodating a more restrictive notation is swamped by the intellectual cost of understanding and formalizing a di cult problem, and proving something about it. We believe that an improved logical formalism would have had a marginal e ect on the size and manageability of the models in any of the large applications we have tackled. We have found the versatility and proof power of ACL2 completely up to the task.
We agree with John Rushby that \comparisons between veri cation systems] are very useful, since they provide the only reasonable way to compare claims for`readability' or`expressiveness' in speci cation languages, and`power' or`e ectiveness' in veri cation environments " 15] . However, it is very easy to overstate the merits of one system over another in such comparisons either by selecting idiosyncratic criteria of comparison or by comparing performance of systems on two very di erent formulations of a problem. For example, if the criteria of merit were the number of open questions in mathematics solved with the prover, the resolution-based Aura system 20] would win hands down. However, Aura likely would not perform well on verifying the Oral Messages algorithm. We believe strongly that the obvious improvement of Rushby's formalization and proof of the Oral Messages algorithm over the version by Bevier and Young is due to his greater insight into the problem, not to any features of EHDM or PVS.
Overly enthusiastic promotion of any automated reasoning system does damage to the entire eld by raising expectations that cannot be ful lled and may foster pervasive misperceptions which are di cult to correct. For example, in a recent report, Ricky Butler describes the translation of some informal requirements speci cations for a simple autopilot into a formal model using PVS 5]. Butler makes the assertion that \the modeling techniques used in this paper can be used with other formal speci cation languages that are based upon higher order logic" (emphasis added). In fact, the reader will be hard pressed to nd even one higher order feature in Butler's speci cation; the entire speci cation can easily be translated to a rst order formalism such as ACL2. 9 To demonstrate that this is so, we translated Butler's speci cation into ACL2 in about two hours work 22]. For the one lemma for which Butler gave proof performance numbers, ACL2 running on a slower machine dispatched the lemma totally automatically in less than one tenth the time. Yet, the casual assertion that higher order logic is somehow required for this speci cation may unfairly bias the non-expert against even considering rst order systems for similar speci cation problems.
We again agree with Rushby that:
Intrinsically hard problems generally involve complex interactions, such as the coordination of distributed, concurrent, or realtime computations, and redundancy management. It requires great skill to address these problems using formal methods, but the number and size of these problems may not be large. The greatest return on formal methods may be obtained when relatively few, very highly skilled people apply formal methods to the hardest and most critical problems. 17]
Whereas two state-of-the-art general-purpose veri cation environments such as PVS and ACL2 have di erent strengths and weaknesses, we believe that either can be an e ective and powerful tool in the hands of a skilled user. Both have been used for some very sophisticated speci cation and proof e orts. On the other hand, at the current stage of automated reasoning development, neither will be particularly useful in the hands of anyone unwilling to invest considerable intellectual e ort.
